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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
JEFFERY GENE SPRAGUE, : Case No. 960154-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal by a criminal defendant from judgment 
of conviction entered February 12, 1996. This Court has 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3 (2) (e) (1996) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
AND PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUES 
ISSUE I: 
Was there sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction on 
counts I, III, VII, VIII, X, and XI charging Appellant Jeffery 
Sprague with burglary of storage units where the only evidence of 
entry into the units was the fact the locks had been cut and the 
doors opened? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
This Court will reverse a criminal case for insufficient 
evidence when the evidence is so inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that "reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime." State 
v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994). The evidence is 
reviewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Id. 
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE: 
Prior to trial, counsel moved to prohibit the State from 
proceeding on those counts where it had not secured the owners of 
the units to testify as to entry. R. 371-75. After the State 
rested, counsel moved to dismiss the above counts. R. 671-73. 
Post-conviction, counsel moved for an arrest of the judgment. 
R. 229. 
ISSUE II: 
Did the trial court commit prejudicial error by allowing 
evidence that on March 29, 1995, the night prior to the charged 
crimes, the same storage facility had been burglarized? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
A trial court's decision to admit evidence under Rule 
404(b) will be reviewed with very limited deference, according it 
a relatively small degree of discretion. State v. Doporto, 308 
Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 21 (Utah 1997). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE: 
Counsel objected to the admission of evidence of the 
March 29 burglary both before trial and throughout the trial. 
R. 377 -78; 391-3; 465-69; 482; 484-85; 488; 785-86. 
TEXT OF DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202(1) (1995) provides: 
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he 
enters or remains unlawfully in a building or any 
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portion of a building with intent to commit a 
felony or theft or commit an assault on any 
person. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201(4) provides: 
"Enter" means: 
(a) Intrusion of any part of the body; or 
(b) Intrusion of any physical object under 
control of the actor. 
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, 
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence. 
Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides: 
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence 
of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible 
to prove the character of a person in order to 
show action in conformity therewith. It may, 
however, be admissible for other purposes, such 
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
The State charged Appellant Jeffery Sprague ("Sprague") 
and a co-defendant with thirteen counts of Burglary, third degree 
felonies; Possession of Burglary Instruments, a class B 
misdemeanor; and Theft by Receiving, a class B misdemeanor. The 
State alleged that on March 30, 1995, Sprague burglarized 
thirteen storage units, possessed bolt cutters used to cut the 
locks, and possessed a lock stolen from one of the units. On 
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November 16, 1995, Sprague was found guilty after a two-day jury 
trial on all counts. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on 
the burglary counts against the co-defendant but found him guilty 
of possession of burglary tools and stolen property. 
Prior to trial, Sprague's counsel moved to prohibit the 
State from referring to burglary counts where it had not secured 
the owners to testify as to whether property was moved about or 
missing from inside their units. Counsel argued that without the 
owners1 testimony, the State could not prove entry on those 
counts. R. 371-75. The trial court denied the motion. R. 375. 
After the State rested, defense counsel moved to dismiss burglary 
counts I, III, VII, VIII, X, and XI on the grounds that the State 
had not established a prima facie case on the element of entry. 
R. 671-73. The trial court noted that the evidence was thin but 
ruled that sufficient evidence had been presented to send those 
counts to the jury. R. 674-75. On December 8, 1995, Sprague!s 
counsel filed a motion to set aside the verdict for insufficient 
evidence. R. 229. On February 12, 1996, the trial court denied 
the motion. R. 791-92. 
Also, prior to trial, counsel moved to suppress evidence 
that on March 29, 1995, the night before the charged burglaries, 
the same storage facility had been burglarized. R. 378. The 
locks on a half dozen units had been cut and the unit doors 
opened. One unit was burglarized both on March 29 and March 30. 
The State sought to introduce evidence that a computer key board 
of the same make as one stolen from one of the units on March 29 
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had been found in Sprague's car the night of his arrest on 
March 30, 1995. R. 376-87. The trial court granted defense 
counsel's motion to suppress evidence of the keyboard because the 
State violated the rules of discovery by failing to provide 
counsel with the police report identifying the keyboard as 
possible stolen property, and because its admission was unfairly 
prejudicial to Sprague's co-defendant. R. 3 87. 
The trial court did allow the State to present evidence 
of the March 29 burglary on the grounds that it was "relevant in 
allowing a full development of the case," and because "there was 
a relationship that could be established between the earlier 
activity and the present activity that had some probative 
significance to the alleged activities of defendants on the 
30th." R. 787. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In the early hours of March 30, 1995, officers Benzon and 
Ricks of the West Jordan Police Department were driving by 
Central Storage on 1700 West and 7210 South when they noticed 
that the gate to the property was open. R. 504; 550. Upon 
further investigation they noticed that the lock had been cut to 
the gate. R. 505. The locks had been cut to thirteen storage 
units and the doors opened. R. 493; 524; 550-51; 571; 596-98. 
Pieces of broken locks were scattered on the ground. R. 551; 
576-81. Unit number 309 had an overlook with a red warning label 
on it because the owner had failed to pay rent. R. 601-02. That 
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lock was missing. R. 602. 
While the officers were investigating the scene, they 
observed a Jeep Wagoneer apparently start to pull into the 
driveway of the storage unit. R. 553. The Jeep crossed over the 
oncoming lane of traffic. When it got to the point where the 
police vehicle parked near the gate was visible, it veered away 
driving past the storage unit on the wrong side of the road. 
R. 506; 508-09; 554-55. Officers Benzon and Ricks pulled the 
vehicle over. R. 509-10; 555-56. Sprague was the driver, and 
his co-defendant was the passenger. R. 511. Prior to being told 
why he was stopped, Sprague insisted that he had not stolen 
anything. R. 556: 20-25. Inside the vehicle were several cut 
locks. R. 513; R. 614: 20-22. One of the locks bore the same 
red label as the overlook missing on unit number 309. R. 52 0-21. 
The manager was able to open the lock with his master key. 
R. 601. The police also found a flashlight, a pair of bolt 
cutters, and a computer keyboard in the vehicle. R. 512; 516; 
533-34; 615. 
Robert Brinkman, a "criminalist" with training in tool 
marks, testified for the State. R. 644-45. Brinkman claimed 
that all bolt cutters, even those of the same run, make and 
manufacturer, left a distinctive mark when used to cut metal. 
R. 648-49. Using equipment intended to compare bullets, Brinkman 
claimed that the marks left by the boltcutters found in Sprague's 
car matched the marks left on one of the locks found in Sprague's 
car and one of the locks found lying on the ground at the storage 
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units. R. 647; 649; 652-53. 
The owners of seven of the units testified that either 
some of their property was missing, or that someone had rummaged 
through their belongings but nothing was missing. R. 416-17; 
421-22; 428; 438; 447; 457; 499. Two of the owners did not 
testify. Four owners testified that none of their property was 
missing and nothing had been disturbed. R. 433; 443; 451; 642. 
Sprague did not testify. He did offer alibi evidence 
that on the night of March 29 to the early hours of March 30, he 
was with his wife. Sprague's wife testified that Sprague was 
with her from about 6:00 p.m. on March 29 until he left at 
1:45 a.m. to take home her brother, the co-defendant. 
Mrs. Sprague stated they were at a bowling alley from about 
9:45 p.m. to around midnight. From the bowling alley, they went 
to the VFW Lounge until 1:00 a.m. and then returned home. 
R. 677-81. 
Alan Keefe, the bartender at the VFW Lounge, testified 
that though he did not know Sprague by name, he recalled seeing 
Sprague and his wife from about 10:00 p.m. to 1:00 a.m. one night 
near the end of March. R. 692-96. 
Ron Babcock, manager of All Star Lanes, also did not know 
the Spragues personally, but remembered seeing them towards the 
end of March between the hours of 10:00 p.m. and midnight. 
R. 710-14. 
Jack Jennings, the co-defendant, testified that he 
babysat for the Spragues that night. R. 724-26. Sometime around 
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1:50 a.m., Sprague gave him a ride home. R. 728. Sprague had 
been drinking and was swerving. Jennings stated that they saw 
the lights at Central Storage, but denied that Sprague started to 
pull into the storage units before being pulled over by the 
police. R. 730-37. 
Terry Jennings, Sprague's father-in-law, testified that 
he loaned the bolt cutters to Sprague on March 29, the day 
Sprague was arrested. R. 698-99. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
There was insufficient evidence to establish the element 
of entry in Counts I, III, VII, X, and XI. The only evidence of 
entry was the fact that the locks had been cut and the doors 
opened. The State argued that because the other units had been 
entered, the jury could infer that the remaining units were also 
entered but that Sprague found nothing to steal. This is an 
impermissible inference because it essentially relieves the State 
of having to prove each element of each charge beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The State's argument is the equivalent of 
saying that if it showed Sprague was guilty of burglarizing some 
of the units, the jury could simply assume he was guilty of the 
others without independent evidence of the element of entry. 
This inference violates Rule 404's prohibition against the 
introduction of evidence of other crimes to show the defendant 
acted in conformity with his propensity to engage in criminal 
conduct. 
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The trial court erred by allowing evidence of the 
March 29 burglary of storage units. The March 29 burglary was 
not so linked to the March 3 0 burglary in time and circumstance 
that the State could not coherently present its case without it. 
The March 29 burglary was not admissible as part of a common plan 
or scheme or as evidence of a modus operandi under Rule 404(b). 
The commission of a series of burglaries with no distinctive 
features did not constitute an overall plan of which the March 29 
burglary was a part or a modus operandi. Lastly, there was not 
sufficient evidence connecting Sprague to the March 2 9 burglary 
to make it probative of identity. 
Even if evidence of the March 29 burglary were admissible 
under Rule 404(b), its probative value was so marginal that it 
did not outweigh the prejudice to Sprague. The State's 
presentation of evidence of the March 29 burglary cast suspicion 
on Sprague, and the clear implication was that he committed them 
both. The resulting confusion of the issues was prejudicial to 
Sprague. He essentially was forced to try to defend against both 
accusations. Unlike, his co-defendant, Sprague only had an alibi 
for the March 30 burglary. The jury may have believed Sprague's 
alibi created a reasonable doubt as to the March 3 0 burglary, but 
convicted anyway because of the inference that he was responsible 
for the March 29 burglary. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
ESTABLISH THE ELEMENT OF ENTRY IN COUNTS I, III, 
VII, VIII, X, AND XI CHARGING SPRAGUE WITH 
BURGLARY. 
In order to sustain a challenge based on insufficient 
evidence, the appellant must marshal all the evidence supporting 
the trial court's decision, including all reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom, and demonstrate it is legally insufficient. 
State v. Gray, 851 P.2d 1217, 1225 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
The following adverse evidence was presented by the State to 
establish the element of entry: 
1. Wesly Taylor, the manager of the storage 
units, testified that the locks to all the units in 
question had been cut and the doors to the units were 
open. R. 597-98. 
2. The owners of the units not in question 
testified that either property was missing from their 
units or their belongings had been rummaged through. 
R. 413-17; 420-22; 427-28; 436-38; 444-47; 456-57; 499. 
3. The owners of units 309 and 456 in Counts III 
and VII did not testify. 
4. The owners of units 307, 455, 706 and 707 
testified that the locks had been cut and the doors were 
open on their units. None of their property had been 
disturbed or stolen. R. 432-33; 442-43; 451; 642. 
From the above evidence, the jury could have concluded 
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that because the locks were cut, the doors open, and entry had 
clearly been made into seven of the thirteen units, Sprague 
entered the other units as well but simply found nothing he 
wanted to steal.1 
A. THE STATE CANNOT RELY ON EVIDENCE THAT SOME 
OF THE STORAGE UNITS WERE ENTERED TO PROVE THE 
ELEMENT OF ENTRY ON ALL OF THE UNITS. 
The elements of burglary are set forth in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-202 (1995): 
A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or 
remains unlawfully in a building or any portion 
of a building with intent to commit a felony or 
theft or commit an assault on any person. 
Entry is a crucial element of the offense of burglary. 
At common law, burglary involved breaking and entering the 
dwelling house of another at night with the intent to commit a 
felony. Model Penal Code and Commentaries 221.1, 61. In most 
jurisdictions, the definition of burglary was later greatly 
broadened to include a much larger range of conduct. The initial 
development and later expansion of the crime of burglary was 
largely in response to defects in the early law of attempt. 
Burglary is in essence an attempt to commit another crime. Id. 
at 61-63. 
The common law of attempt ordinarily did not 
reach a person who embarked on a course of 
criminal behavior unless he came very close to 
1
. For the sake of clarity and concision, counsel has cited 
only to that evidence relevant to the element of entry. For a 
complete recitation of all the evidence presented at trial, see the 
Statement of Facts section of this brief. 
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his goal . . . Making entry with criminal intent 
an independent substantive offense carrying 
serious sanctions moved back the moment when the 
law could intervene in criminal design and 
authorized penalties more nearly in accord with 
the seriousness of the actor's conduct . . . On 
the other hand, a greatly expanded burglary 
statute authorizes the prosecutor and the courts 
to treat as burglary behavior that is 
distinguishable from theft or attempted theft 
only on purely artificial grounds . . . Entering 
a henhouse to steal a chicken became a serious 
offense while stealing a chicken at the henhouse 
door was merely petty larceny. 
Id. at 63-63. 
For this reason courts have been reluctant to adopt 
statutory interpretations of the entry element which would 
further expand the crime of burglary. For example, in State v. 
Loncrstreth, 832 P.2d 560, 564-65 (Wyo. 1992), the court rejected 
the State's argument that when the underlying felony in a 
burglary charge is arson, proof that a fire occurred 
automatically satisfied the element of entry. In United States 
v. Eichman, 756 F. Supp. 143, 148 (S.D.N.Y 1991), the court 
declined to accept the government's theory that entry occurred 
when the defendant climbed on the roof of a building to set fire 
to a flag. Citing the common law history of the crime of 
burglary, the court refused to expand the concept of entry to 
include the activity on the roof of the building. Id. 
In this case, the State opted not to submit to the jury a 
lesser included instruction on attempted burglary. The State 
instead chose to rely on the argument that since there were 
multiple charges of burglary, it need only prove entry on some 
counts and not all. The State claimed that if it proved Sprague 
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had entered seven of the thirteen units to commit a theft, he had 
probably entered the other six as well. R. 235-36, 673-74. This 
Court should not allow the State to circumvent a crucial element 
of the burglary statute by relying largely on evidence of other 
crimes as proof of entry. 
The law does not permit the State to argue or the jury to 
infer that if it found Sprague was guilty of burglarizing some of 
the units, it could assume his guilt of burglarizing the others. 
State v. Doporto, 308 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 21 (Utah 1997) (evidence 
is not admissible to show a defendant's propensity to commit 
criminal acts). Essentially, this line of reasoning allows the 
jury to conclude that if Sprague is guilty of some charges, he is 
probably guilty of the others without independent evidence to 
support the element of entry on each count. 
This reasoning violates the long-standing rule of law 
that one crime cannot be offered to prove the defendant committed 
another similar offense against a different person. .Id. at 21; 
People of the Territory of Utah v. Coucrhlin, 44 P. 94, 95 (Utah 
18 96). This principle of law has been carried over into modern 
rules of evidence and procedure. For example, Rule 404(b), Utah 
Rules of Evidence prohibits the introduction of evidence of other 
crimes to prove the defendant's propensity to commit crime. It 
is improper for a prosecutor to argue that because a defendant 
has been convicted of burglary in the past, he is probably guilty 
of a current charge of theft. State v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368, 
1372 (Utah 1986). A defendant is entitled to severance of the 
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charges where joinder allows the jury to use evidence of his 
prior crime as the basis for an inference that he committed 
current charges of burglary and theft. State v. Saunders, 699 
P.2d 738, 741-42 (Utah 1985). 
Rule 404(b) does allow evidence of prior crimes as 
evidence of a common plan or scheme. State v. Featherson, 781 
P.2d 424, 428 (Utah 1989); State v. Forsvth, 641 P.2d 1172, 1176 
(Utah 1982). Even if evidence of the other burglaries were 
admissible under a common scheme rationale, such evidence would 
not establish actual entry. An individual acting under a common 
scheme could stand at the threshold without entering. Nothing in 
the evidence suggests that part of the common plan was to enter 
each unit. Lastly, the common plan or scheme theory does not 
allow the State to essentially avoid its duty to prove each 
element of each count of burglary beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
State cannot rely on the fact that it proved entry on some of the 
counts to relieve its burden to show entry on all the counts by 
arguing that there was an overall plan to burglarize storage 
units. 
Indeed, even if those counts where entry was shown were 
the subject of a prior prosecution, evidence of those burglaries 
would not be admissible in a subsequent trial to prove entry on 
the remaining counts under Rule 4 04(b). 
Evidence of an extrinsic offense may be 
admissible when it logically raises an inference 
that the defendant was engaged in a larger, more 
comprehensive plan. The existence of a plan then 
tends to prove that the defendant committed the 
14 
charged crime, since commission of that crime 
would lead to the completion of the overall plan. 
United States v. Krezdorn, 639 F.2d 1327, 1331 (5th Cir. 1981) . 
Evidence of the larger plan or scheme must also be relevant to a 
material issue in the case. Id.; Featherson, 781 P.2d at 428. 
In this case, that issue would be entry. Evidence that 
Sprague entered some units does not automatically lead to the 
inference that he entered others. At best, it demonstrates a 
tendency to commit burglaries of storage units. Evidence of 
other crimes is not admissible for this purpose. 
For example, in Krezdorn, the defendant was charged with 
four counts of forgery. The trial court admitted evidence of 
thirty-two additional uncharged forgeries as part of a common 
plan or scheme to commit forgeries. 639 F.2d at 1331. The Fifth 
Circuit held that evidence that the defendant committed the crime 
more times than he was charged with did not constitute a common 
plan. Ld. at 1331-32. The court noted that the fact that there 
were thirty-six forgeries instead of four did not establish 
anything but a repetition of similar criminal acts. The court 
reasoned that at best, the evidence merely demonstrated the 
defendant's propensity to commit forgeries and was not admissible 
under Rule 404(b) for that purpose. Id. 
B. EVIDENCE THAT THE LOCKS WERE CUT AND THE 
DOORS OPEN WAS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE UNITS WERE ENTERED. 
Lastly, the fact that the locks were cut and the doors 
were open is not sufficient alone to establish the element of 
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entry. People v. Simien, 656 P.2d 698 (Colo. 1983) . In Simien, 
the defendant was convicted of burglary of a trailer. The jury 
heard evidence that the trailer door had been opened. The only 
other evidence that the trailer had been entered was the fact 
that a roll of roofing material of the kind stored in the trailer 
had been removed and was lying on the ground. The owner was 
unable to say whether the roll had been there when he left the 
evening before the crime. Id. at 700. The Colorado Supreme 
Court held that there was insufficient evidence to support the 
conclusion that the trailer had been entered. Id. 
In this case, the fact that the locks were cut and the 
doors opened may show a substantial step towards the commission 
of a burglary, but it is insufficient to establish that Sprague 
actually entered the storage unit. Because the doors slide 
upwards like a garage door, they are easily opened without having 
to actually enter the unit with hands or feet. (See State!s 
Exhibit 8) .2 Compare with State v. Peterson, 881 P. 2d 965 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994) (kick to open door held sufficient to establish 
entry). It is purely a matter of speculation as to whether the 
perpetrator entered the open units or simply stood on the 
threshold and looked inside. Therefore, Sprague!s conviction on 
these counts should be reversed and remanded for dismissal. 
2
. The photographs included in the record appear to be from 
the preliminary hearing as the exhibit numbers do not correspond 
with the transcript. The actual photos submitted at trial are in 
the District Court. Counsel has requested that such photographs be 
transmitted to this Court. 
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POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR 
THE 
BY ALLOWING 
STORAGE UNITS 
THE 
HAD 
JURY 
ALSO 
TO HEAR 
BEEN 
EVIDENCE 
BURGLARIZED 
THAT 
THE 
NIGHT BEFORE. 
The trial court erred in allowing evidence of the 
March 29 burglary of the storage units. The court initially 
stated that it was not admitting the evidence under Rule 4 04(b). 
R. 787. Later, the court ruled that evidence of the prior 
burglary was admissible in order to allow the State to fully 
develop its case. The court also held that there was a 
relationship between the earlier burglary and the present charges 
which was probative of the defendants1 activities on March 30. 
R. 787. Lastly, the trial court ruled that the evidence did not 
prejudice the defendants because it allowed them to offer a 
defense for the March 29 burglary. R. 787-88. Though the trial 
court claimed that it was not admitting the evidence under Rule 
404(b), its rationale for allowing the evidence clearly falls 
within Rule 404(b)'s ambit. 
Evidence of the March 29 burglary was initially submitted 
by the prosecution in an attempt to tie the activities of Sprague 
to both burglaries under the rubric of a common plan or scheme. 
R. 379-80, 383. The State charged Sprague with burglary. The 
mere fact that the State presented extensive evidence of the 
March 29 burglary cast additional suspicion on Sprague. The jury 
was told the number of units that were broken into on March 29. 
R. 482-84. A State's witness marked the location of those units. 
R. 482-84. The jury heard evidence from three different State's 
witnesses that on March 29, the locks on additional units had 
17 
been cut and the doors opened. R. 502-04; 548-50; 592-93. Two 
police officers testified about the March 29 burglary. R. 502-
04; 548-50. Sprague's co-defendant offered an alibi for the 
March 29 burglary. R. 709. 
The average juror would surely assume the State was 
offering this evidence against the defendants in its case in 
chief for a reason. The natural and clear implication was that 
Sprague committed both burglaries. In fact, the trial court 
recognized that implication when it stated that the co-defendant 
was "helped" by the evidence of the prior burglary. The trial 
court stated that because the co-codefendant had an alibi for the 
March 2 9 burglary, his defense to the March 3 0 burglary was 
strengthened. R. 787-88. Unlike the co-defendant, Sprague did 
not have an alibi for both nights. 
Rule 4 04(b) provides the only means by which this 
evidence could be admitted. Because of its inherent inflammatory 
potential, evidence of prior crimes is presumed to be 
inadmissible. Doporto, 308 Utah Adv. Rep. at 21. Prior to 
admitting prior bad acts evidence, the trial court must find 
that: 
(1) there is a necessity for the prior crime 
evidence, (2) it is highly probative of a 
material issue of the crime charged, and (3) its 
special probativeness and the necessity for it 
outweigh its prejudicial effect. 
Id. at 21. 
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A. EVIDENCE OF THE MARCH 29 BURGLARY WAS NOT 
ADMISSIBLE UNDER RULE 404B FOR THE PURPOSE OF 
ALLOWING THE STATE TO EXPLAIN THE CONTEXT AND 
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE MARCH 3 0 BURGLARY. 
Evidence of prior crimes is admissible where the 
"uncharged offense is so linked together in point of time and 
circumstances with the crime charged that one cannot be fully 
shown without proving the other." Krezdorn, 639 F.2d at 1331-32 
(5th Cir. 1981); State v. Nelson, 777 P.2d 479, 481 (Utah 1989). 
Under this exception, evidence of the prior crime is necessary to 
explain the context, circumstances or setting of the crime 
charged in order to "complete the story." The justification for 
allowing the evidence is that it would otherwise be impossible 
for the State to present a coherent story of the events 
surrounding the charge. Nelson, 777 P.2d at 481; Krezdorn, 639 
F.2d at 1331-32. The trial court relied, in part, on this 
exception in allowing the evidence of the March 29 burglary. 
R. 787: 8-11. 
Evidence of other crimes may not be admitted "simply 
because it recounts events temporally related to the commission 
of a crime for which the accused is on trial." United States v. 
Childs, 598 F.2d 169, 173 (C.A.D.C. 1979). This exception hinges 
on the State's showing of necessity and does not automatically 
make admissible prior bad act evidence simply because the events 
took place close in time to the charged crime. See also Johnson, 
748 P.2d at 1075. Doporto made it clear that 404(b) evidence must 
be necessary. 3 08 Utah Adv. Rep. at 22. Necessity is an 
independent, threshold requirement. Even if the evidence is 
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probative, even if its probative value outweighs its prejudicial 
effect, the State must show that its admission is essential to 
establishing its case. This independent requirement prevents the 
State from gratuitously capitalizing on the highly prejudicial 
impact of 404(b) evidence. The State must justify its use of 
404(b) evidence by establishing that admission of the evidence is 
unavoidable or compelled by the circumstances of the case. 
For example, in Nelson, the court allowed evidence that 
the defendant had committed sexual acts against his brother as 
well as the victim because the acts of sodomy were committed upon 
both boys on the same day. The victim could not relate what took 
place that day without mentioning the defendant's conduct with 
his brother. 777 P.2d 481. But in State v. Holder, 694 P.2d 583, 
584-85 (Utah 1984), the court did not allow evidence in an auto 
theft case that 20 minutes prior to the defendant's arrest in the 
stolen car, the defendant had committed a robbery. Similarly, in 
Featherson, 781 P.2d 424 (Utah 1989), the court did not allow 
evidence that the defendant had made nonconsensual sexual 
advances to other women the same day he allegedly assaulted the 
victim. 
In this case, the State ostensibly offered evidence of 
the March 2 9 burglary to show: (1) that unit number 711 had been 
burglarized twice; (2) the location of the units; and (3) that 
all the units were locked before the March 3 0 burglary. R. 4 85; 
469. None of these alleged purposes justifies admission of 
evidence of the March 29 burglary. The prior burglary was not 
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integrally linked to the March 30 burglary to the degree that the 
State could not present its case without mention of it. 
In fact, the State did not need to present evidence of the 
March 29 burglary at all. 
The manager of the storage units was able to testify that 
when he made his last inspection of the grounds before the 
March 3 0 burglary, all the units were locked and secure without 
reference to the prior burglary. R. 440. The owner of unit 711 
testified that she locked her unit prior to the March 3 0 burglary 
and afterwards found that property had been stolen that was there 
before. There is no relevance to the fact that her unit was 
burglarized twice. R. 456-7. The March 29 burglary was not 
relevant to the location of the units burglarized on March 30. 
Conversely, it is unclear what relevance the location of the 
units burglarized on March 29 had to the March 3 0 burglary. 
B. EVIDENCE OF THE MARCH 29 BURGLARY WAS NOT 
ADMISSIBLE TO SHOW A COMMON SCHEME OR ESTABLISH A 
MODUS OPERANDI. 
Prior crime evidence cannot be used to prove a point not 
really contested. Doporto, 3 08 Utah Adv. Rep. at 21. In this 
case, the only contested issue was identity. Evidence of a 
common scheme or plan can be probative of identity. However, the 
court in this case fell "into the common error of equating acts 
and circumstances which are merely similar in nature with the 
more narrow common scheme or plan." Featherson, 781 P.2d at 429 
(quoting State v. Harris, 677 P.2d 202, 205 (Wash. Ct. App. 
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1984)). Simple repetition of a similar criminal act does not 
constitute the more precise common scheme or plan. Deporto, 3 08 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 22; Krezdorn. 639 F.2d at 1331. "A loose 
relevance of prior bad acts to a crime charged based on 
unremarkable similarities of conduct is not sufficiently 
probative to justify its admission." Deporto 308 Utah Adv. Rep. 
at 22 . 
Likewise, evidence of a modus operandi can also be 
relevant to identity. In order to establish modus operandi, 
there must be unusual or unique features common between the prior 
crime and the crime charged. Similar features which are common 
to any crime of the same type do not suffice to establish a modus 
operandi. Id. 
For example, in Sutphin v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 33 7 
S.E.2d 897 (Va. Ct. App. 1985), the defendant was charged with 
burglarizing a market by using a cinder block to break the glass 
door. Id. at 898-99. At trial, the government introduced 
evidence that a few hours earlier, Sutphin had attempted to 
burglarize another market in the area by breaking the glass with 
a brick. The evidence was admitted to show identity through a 
prior plan or scheme. JEd. at 899. The court held the evidence 
was not admissible. Id. at 900. The court reasoned: 
It is not enough that the other offense is merely 
similar to the offense charged or closely 
connected to it in time. The offenses must be 
both closely related in time and tend to show a 
general scheme or guilty knowledge and 
intent . . . That the offenses were of the same 
type does not evidence a general scheme . . . 
[M]ore is required than merely proving repeated 
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commission of crimes of the same class. 
Id. at 899-900. 
The court also rejected the argument that the manner in 
which the two burglaries were committed was unusual and 
distinctive thus demonstrating a modus operandi. Id. The court 
held that breaking a glass door with a piece of cinder block to 
commit a burglary was not a sufficiently distinctive feature to 
prove identity. Since the manner in which the burglaries were 
committed was not unusual or distinctive, the evidence was 
inadmissible. .Id. at 900. 
This case is strikingly similar to Sutphin. In this 
case, evidence of the prior storage unit burglaries demonstrates 
only a repetition of a type of crime, not a step toward the 
completion of an overall plan which would allow one to infer that 
the same person committed both offenses. Nor were there any 
unusual or unique similarities between the two crimes. The two 
burglaries were similar factually in that both occurred at the 
same storage facility and the locks had been cut on the units. 
These similarities, however, are common to almost any burglary of 
storage units. Because the similarities between the two 
burglaries are not particularly distinctive, they do not 
establish a common plan or scheme. Nor do they establish a modus 
operandi. Deporto, 308 Utah Adv. Rep. at 22; Featherson, 781 
P.2d at 428-29; compare with State v. Rocco, 795 P.2d 1116 (Utah 
1990) (evidence admissible of prior burglary on the same night 
where defendant forced entry into both homes, bound victims with 
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electrical wire, and set fires with gasoline). 
As in Sutphin, evidence of the March 2 9 burglary did not 
constitute a common plan or scheme probative of the issue of 
identity. Nor were the two crimes sufficiently distinct to 
establish a modus operandi. Therefore, evidence of the March 29 
burglary was not admissible under Rule 4 04(b). 
C. EVIDENCE OF THE MARCH 29 BURGLARY WAS NOT 
HIGHLY PROBATIVE OF IDENTITY BECAUSE THERE WAS 
NOT SUFFICIENT PROOF THAT SPRAGUE COMMITTED THE 
PRIOR OFFENSE. 
Evidence of prior crimes must be "strongly probative of a 
material issue, a probativeness that cannot serve as a ruse for 
showing that the defendant's propensity is such that he is likely 
to have committed the kind of crime charged." Doporto, 308 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 22. For example, in Johnson, the fact that the 
defendant had earlier in the day cashed stolen checks using the 
same false identification as that used in the charged crime was 
highly probative of the identity of the perpetrator. Id. 
Unlike Johnson, in this case, there is not sufficient 
evidence to establish that Sprague committed the prior burglary. 
Because the evidence tying Sprague to the March 2 9 burglary is 
weak at best, the evidence is not highly probative of identity. 
This case is similar to State v. Torqerson, 286 P.2d 800, 801 
(Utah 1955) . In Torqerson, the defendant was charged with 
attempted burglary of a market. The State introduced evidence 
that earlier that evening about eight blocks from the scene of 
the crime, a man was seen breaking the glass in the door of a 
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market and running towards the defendant's car. The court held 
that the evidence was inadmissible because there was not 
sufficient evidence connecting the defendant with the prior 
offense. Id. at 800-02. Since there was not sufficient evidence 
establishing that the man seen breaking the glass was the 
defendant, the evidence of the prior attempted burglary was not 
relevant to establish identity. Id. 
Similarly, in this case, because there was not sufficient 
evidence that Sprague committed the prior burglary, the evidence 
was not highly probative of identity. The only evidence the 
State had to connect Sprague with the prior burglary was a 
computer keyboard found in Spraguefs vehicle. R. 373; 376. The 
keyboard was the same make as one stolen from the storage units 
during the March 2 9 burglary. But, there were no serial numbers 
to positively identify it at as stolen property. No other stolen 
property from the March 2 9 burglary was found in Sprague's 
vehicle. R. 373; 376. There was no evidence placing Sprague or 
his vehicle at the storage unit on March 29. Given the minimal 
amount of evidence connecting Sprague with the March 29 burglary, 
this evidence was not highly probative of identity and should not 
have been admitted. 
D. THE MINIMAL PROBATIVE VALUE OF THE MARCH 29 
BURGLARY WAS SUBSTANTIALLY OUTWEIGHED BY ITS 
PREJUDICIAL EFFECT. 
Even if evidence of the March 2 9 burglary were admissible 
under Rule 404(b), it did not meet the requirements of Rule 403. 
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Several factors have been identified for consideration in 
balancing the probative value of evidence against its prejudicial 
effect: 
the strength of the evidence as to the commission 
of the other crime, the similarities between the 
crimes, the interval of time that has elapsed 
between the crimes, the need for the evidence, 
the efficacy of alternative proof, and the degree 
to which the evidence probably will rouse the 
jury to overmastering hostility. 
State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295-96 (Utah 1988). 
Here, the State was easily able to present all relevant 
evidence to the March 3 0 burglary in a coherent fashion without 
reference to the prior burglary. Sprague did not take the stand 
and claim lack of intent or knowledge. His was an alibi defense. 
Identity was the only issue in the case. Evidence of the 
March 29 burglary had little probative value to establish 
identity. The March 2 9 burglary was not part of an overall plan 
to commit the March 3 0 burglary, and there was nothing 
distinctive about the way they were committed. The two crimes 
were similar only in those features common to any burglary of a 
storage unit. Lastly, the strength of the evidence tying Sprague 
to the March 2 9 burglary was weak. 
On the other side of the equation, "prior crime evidence 
has inherent and unavoidable inflammatory potential." Doporto, 
308 Utah Adv. Rep. at 21. These dangers are more likely and the 
prejudice greater when, as in this case, the prior crime is of 
the same type as the charged crime. In this situation, the 
probative value of the evidence is even less likely to outweigh 
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the resulting confusion of the issues and prejudice to the 
defendant. State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1334 n. 44 (Utah 
1986). In this case, the probative value of the March 29 
burglary was too weak to overcome the presumption of prejudice to 
Sprague. Compounding the problem was the fact that no 
instruction was given to the jury as to how this evidence should 
be viewed. 
The prejudice to Sprague was such that the error was not 
harmless. It is important to note that the mere fact that the 
jury could have concluded that Sprague was guilty without the 
improper evidence does not render the error harmless. The 
central question is whether it can be stated with assurance that 
the jury was not influenced by the erroneous admission of the 
evidence. Doporto, 3 08 Utah Adv. Rep. at 24. In Doporto, the 
court recognized that the jury could have concluded the victim 
was telling the truth without hearing the prior crime evidence. 
But because the court could not conclude that the jury was 
uninfluenced by the improper evidence when they assessed the 
defendant's and the victim1s credibility, the error was not 
harmless. Id. 
Evidence of the prior burglary was intertwined with 
evidence of the charged crime. Even some of the State's 
witnesses became confused as to which night they were to testify 
about. R. 484; 540-41. Sprague's co-defendant offered an alibi 
for the night of the March 29 burglary. The implication that 
Sprague committed the prior burglary diverted attention away from 
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his alibi defense for the March 3 0 burglary. The State could 
then bypass Sprague's alibi defense by linking his guilt to the 
March 2 9 burglary. The jury could have believed his alibi, but 
convicted anyway on the belief he was nonetheless guilty of the 
March 2 9 burglary. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
his convictions on all counts; remand Counts II, IV, V, VI, IX, 
XII, XIII, XIV, and XV for a new trial; and remand Counts I, III, 
VII, VIII, X, and XI with orders for dismissal. 
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